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Corinth Publication: Fleck & Hanssen, Working Paper , 2012 | Collection: | | Corinth | | Name: | | Fleck & Hanssen, Working Paper , 2012 | | Title: | | How Tyranny Paved the Way to Wealth and Democracy: The Democratic Transition in Ancient Greece | | Author: | | Fleck, Robert K. & Hanssen, F. Andrew | | Series Title: | | Working Paper | | Month: | | February | | Date: | | 2012 | | Abstract: | | When a ruling elite is unable to commit to future growth-promoting policies, it may cede political power to a broader segment of the public, as in North and Weingast (1989). Alternatively, as we show in this paper, commitment may be achieved by moving in the opposite direction: installing a single authoritarian ruler who favors growth-promoting policies. Although this narrows the distribution of power in the short run, it may as our model illustrates be a step toward, not away from, democracy. We apply the model to ancient Greece. Many of the famously democratic poleis (city-states) of Greece's Classical period were ruled by tyrants in the earlier Archaic period. The tyrannies of Archaic Greece were transitory institutions, generally lasting only a few decades, with strong similarities across poleis in the factors that led to their appearance and the types of policies enacted. Using a unique data set, we examine the relationships between the potential for economic growth, Archaic period tyranny, and Classical period democracy. We conclude that a high potential for economic growth led to a pro-growth political institution (the tyrant) that led in turn to increased wealth and, eventually, to democracy. These findings are consistent with critical junctures theory the institutional path determines both wealth and democracy. | | URL: | | http://www4.ncsu.edu/~rghammon/workshop.html |
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